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Resumo
Este artigo se baseia em um estudo de caso para ex-
plorar o papel da administração pública em sistemas 
de governança ambiental, examinando a regulação 
ambiental brasileira do setor de petróleo e gás offsho-
re. A metodologia utilizada segue o quadro da Aná-
lise e Desenvolvimento Institucional e compreende 
entrevistas, revisão documental e observação direta. 
Os resultados apresentam o ambiente institucio-
nal, incluindo as regras em uso e variáveis  externas. 
Concluindo, três elementos que operam no nível or-
ganizacional são destacados: meios de participação 
das partes interessadas; estabilidade e formas de in-
teração entre a equipe; e autonomia para garantir o 
cumprimento dos arranjos estabelecidos.
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Abstract
This article draws upon theory and a case 
study to research public administration’s role 
in environmental governance systems. Thus, it 
examines Brazil’s environmental regulation of 
the offshore oil and gas sector. The methodology 
used follows the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework and supports interviews, 
documentation review and direct observation. 
The results indicate the main features of the 
institutional setting, including the rules in use 
and relevant external variables. Concluding, three 
key elements operating at the organizational 
level are highlighted: the means of stakeholder 
participation; the stability and forms of interaction 
within the personnel; and the autonomy to enforce 
established arrangements. 
Keywords: Environmental Governance; Public Poli- 
cy; Institutional Development; Public Administra-
tion.
* Environmental Engineer, M.Sc. in Public Policy, Strategies, Development and Sustainability. Environmental 
analyst at the Oil and Gas Production Coordination of the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Natural 
Renewable Resources (COPROD/IBAMA). https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2051-8571.
Email: breda@poli.ufrj.br (Corresponding author).
** Associate professor at the Institute of Economics of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and researcher 
at the National Institute of Science and Technology in Public Policies, Strategy and Development. She was a 
postdoctoral scholar at Columbia University (USA) and holds a PhD from the Graduate Program in Social Sciences 
in Development, Agriculture and Society of the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (CPDA / UFRRJ). Her 
research focuses on business strategies and sustainability; social-environmental regulation and self-regulation, 
and socio-environmental conflicts. https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6217-2471. Email: valeriagdavinha@gmail.com. 
Recebido em 10 de fevereiro de 2020. Aceito em 15 de maio de 2020. – http://dx.doi.org/10.51861/ded.dmv.2.005
64 Desenvolvimento em Debate
Tomás de Oliveira Bredariol e Valeria Gonçalves da Vinha
INTRODUCTION
Governance as a concept has evolved from a view more centred on 
the nature and role of the state in policy making to a greater focus on the 
coordination of social systems to face major problems (Enroth 2014). 
This notion emphasizes the existence of networks and the importance 
of addressing dangers which often transcend standing collectivities and 
institutional arrangements. 
In this context, the objective of this article is to provide further knowledge 
of how the public administration may fulfil its role in environmental 
governance systems. Moreover, the article uses a pluralist perspective of 
environmental governance (Davidson and Frickel 2004) in an attempt to 
identify important functions and features of regulatory agencies. 
Therefore, we conducted a case study in the General Coordination of 
Marine and Coastal Undertakings (CGMAC) from the Brazilian Institute of 
Environment and Natural Renewable Resources (IBAMA). Two of its units 
were the focus of this research, the Oil and Gas Exploration Coordination and 
the Oil and Gas Production Coordination. These are based in Rio de Janeiro 
since 1998, where most of oil and gas operators have their headquarters. Their 
primary task is to analyse and condition requests for permission to install 
and operate offshore oil and gas projects in Brazil. CGMAC is subordinate 
to the Environmental Licensing Directory of IBAMA, which conducts all 
federal environmental permitting in the country. 
THEORY: ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE - FEATURES AND 
FUNCTIONS
Environmental governance operates within social-ecological systems 
(SES), where society is embedded in ecosystems and intertwined relations 
lead to changing environmental results. Two areas of research serve as the 
grounding for SES science: systems approach and adaptative management; 
and the study of institutions and property rights (Berkes and Folke 1998). 
Furthermore, it focuses on having an integrated perspective of humans-in-
nature and the concept of resilience (Folke et al. 2016). Resilience is a concept 
that reflects the capacity of a system to: cope with change, maintaining its 
functions and structures; self-organize; and progressively develop its capacity 
of learning and adaptation (Berkes, 2005).
According to Ostrom (2009a) there are four core subsystems of SES 
which interact to produce outcomes at the SES level, which in turn provide 
feedback to affect these subsystems and their components, as well other 
larger or smaller SES: governance systems (e.g. environmental legislation 
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and agencies); resource systems (e.g. marine ecosystems); resource units (e.g. 
corals, fish); and users (e.g. fishers, oil and gas companies). Each of those 
has several associated variables that condition possible interactions and 
outcomes of SES – together with the existing social, economic and political 
settings. The interplay of these different elements in multiple levels leads to 
adaptive cycles of what one may call a panarchy. This term is a representation 
of a set of adaptive cycles that nest within each other across space and time 
scales (Holling, 2001).Environmental governance is about addressing the 
problem of fit between ecosystems and institutions (Folke et al. 2007) and 
trying to coordinate actors to meet this challenge.
Institutions, in turn, are humanly devised constraints that structure 
social, political and economic interaction (North, 1991). These may be both 
formal (e.g. laws and property rights) or informal (e.g. traditions or codes of 
conduct). Moreover, a degree of stability and, therefore, path dependence – 
meaning that previous conditions mould significantly further developments 
– characterize these systems. In this sense, the study of institutional change 
is key to understanding present conditions and acting to improve them. 
It has resulted in a variety of theoretical approaches that emphasize different 
processes, such as the active design of institutions, their spontaneous 
evolution, as well as the role of habit and learning (Kingston & Caballero 
2009). 
In this context, the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework 
(IAD) aims to organize diagnostic, analytical, and prescriptive capabilities 
dealing with governance systems (Ostrom, 2011). The IAD is thus a 
multi-tier conceptual map, which identifies the major types of structural 
variables that are present to some extent in all institutional arrangements. 
More specifically, it poses the following set of variables for an institutional 
arrangement: biophysical conditions; attributes of the community; rules-in-
use; evaluative criteria; and its central part, the action situations (Ostrom, 
2011). When analysing an institutional issue, one should bear in mind 
that its configuration results from nested layers of hierarchical rules. Thus, 
problems may be associated to operational (e.g. policy implementation), 
collective-choice (e.g. policy formulation) or constitutional tiers (e.g. who 
may participate in the policy formulation) (Ostrom 2005). In this sense, 
rules-in-use affect the elements of action situations, for example, position 
rules delimit how many positions exist and how many actors hold each 
position (Ostrom, 2009b). 
Research efforts related to the IAD frequently face polycentric social 
systems, characterized by the existence of many decision centres with limited 
and autonomous prerogatives, operating under an overarching set of rules 
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(Aligica & Tarko, 2012). Highly polycentric governance systems, comprising 
several agencies and management levels, have been associated to higher 
environmental output than equivalent monocentric governance (Newig 
& Fristsch, 2009). Also noteworthy is that researchers assume that these 
systems possess a higher ability to adapt to a changing environment and to 
be less affected in their integrity by sudden changes or failures in one of its 
parts (Wostl, 2009). Nonetheless, the number of stakeholders involved often 
implies significant transaction costs, thus actors must be willing to expend 
considerable amounts of time and energy in seeking and implementing 
commonly acceptable solutions (McGinnis, 2013). Moreover, power and 
resource imbalances may hinder the capability of actors to participate, and 
unless met with a positive strategy of representation and empowerment, 
this may compromise the effectiveness of the initiative (Ansell & Gash, 
2008). In these contexts, bridging or boundary organization can play an 
intermediary function and facilitate the sharing of relevant information and 
the advancement of knowledge (Cash et al., 2006).
Another frequent element in environmental governance systems is an 
adaptive approach. In a setting of complexity and continuous learning, 
retaining flexibility and dealing with risk is paramount to action in view 
of existing uncertainties. Therefore, the principles of experimentation 
and dynamic adjustment underly adaptive policy-making, resulting from 
information and knowledge advances, changing ecosystem conditions and 
stressors, as well as the observed effects of past deeds (Karkkainen, 2004). 
In this way, institution building, trust building, and social learning – all 
of which require time and repeated rounds of learning-by-doing – are 
fundamental (Armitage et al., 2007). 
Hence, environmental governance aims to fulfil several functions, 
including: regulation of resource use and distribution of its benefits; 
provisioning; monitoring; enforcement; conflict resolution; and collective 
choice (Paavola, 2007). It should also meet other requirements, such as 
to enable technical, physical and institutional infrastructure – as well as 
encourage adaptation and change (Dietz at al., 2003). Each governance 
arrangement will organize these functions differently and implement 
distinctive strategies to meet existing requirements, according to its 
specific attributes and scale.  Even so, at the heart of the choices to be made 
are political decisions (Graaf et al., 1996) which will result in different 
developmental paths. Thus, environmental governance deals with equity 
and justice, comprising distributive issues related to alternative scenarios of 
environmental change. Furthermore, it involves a plurality of values related to 
the co-existence of incommensurable ethical premises of behaviour, resulting 
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in different understandings of what is just (Paavola, 2007). Therefore, it is 
impossible to compare alternative solutions in equal standards, meaning that 
procedural justice is essential to ensure the legitimacy of the system – since it 
provides the recognition of affected parties’ interests.
Taking environmental governance challenges and purposes into account, 
the state remains a key factor in this equation due to the necessity of 
arbitrating the distribution of costs and benefits related to environmental 
change (Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Gunningham (2009) provides a minimum 
set of three roles for governments in collaborative arrangements: 
• Definitional guidance, orienting the scope and intentions of efforts 
as well the structure of the governance system; 
• Participatory incentives, be they positive (e.g. inducements) or 
negative (e.g. punitive sanction); 
• Enforcement capability, ensuring evaluative criteria, performance 
indicators and other means to guarantee the assessment and 
fulfilment of objectives.  
Ultimately, how the public sector participates in environmental 
governance systems is a chief element of its outcomes and depends on 
effective methods and adequate resources.
METHODS
This work takes an exploratory approach to research how regulatory 
agencies participate in environmental governance systems. Therefore, a 
case study was conducted, using sources of evidence commonly applied 
in this methodology: interviews; documentation; archival records; direct 
observation; and participant observation (Yin, 2001).  
The case departs from the experience of two public environmental 
units from CGMAC. It regards the environmental governance of offshore 
oil and gas projects in Brazil, which is circumscribed in the larger system of 
coastal and marine environmental protection. The focus on this system was 
established due to the breadth of the theme and to the authors` accessibility 
to related sources of data.
To address relevant theoretical discussions, the research design was based 
on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, as outlined by 
Ostrom (2011), considering:
• The main attributes of an action situation; 
• external variables, including biophysical conditions, attributes of 
community and rules-in-use that affect each element of the action 
situation
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• existing interactions and possible outcomes; and
• evaluative criteria.
Thus, the IAD framework was the main methodological reference for 
this study, supporting the analysis of results and the identification of key 
findings. Remarkably, the focus of this work was not a typical common 
pool resource, such as forests or fisheries (Agrawal, 2004), as seen in similar 
applications of the IAD, but a unit of public administration. This draws upon 
the acknowledgement that environmental agencies may be characterized by 
the attributes of subtractability of use and difficulty of exclusion as defined 
by Ostrom (2009b).
We considered all collected data to ensure the triangulation of 
information. Nonetheless, the fundamental elements of the study were the 
interviews and questionnaires, where a proper focus could be directed to the 
topics of interest and tailored to address the IAD framework. Accordingly, 
the interviews were semi-structured and followed a script with four main 
subjects:
• Institutional background and evolution – considering the history, 
developments and learning mechanisms of the governance system; 
• Environmental permitting’s role in the environmental governance 
system – identifying external variables, existing controls and 
evaluative criteria;
• Institutional details – such as forms of organization, formal and 
informal practices, as well as feedback mechanisms and access to 
resources;
• Critical aspects – which addresses key problems, conflicts and 
positive characteristics.
The script also enabled the discussion of other topics present in the 
literature related to successful governance arrangements, such as the presence 
of graduated sanction instruments and other design principles of sustained 
institutions (Ostrom 2009b). Moreover, interviewees included over a dozen 
individuals from several organizations, featuring: other public agencies 
(e.g. the National Oil and Gas Agency – ANP); environmental consulting 
firms; representatives from the oil and gas industry; CGMAC’s coordinators 
and environmental analysts; other divisions of IBAMA; and companies 
providing services offshore. Appendix A shows a brief qualification of 
interviewees as well as the reference code used throughout this text. Each 
interview was summarized and shared with the respective participant for 
eventual correction or complementation. 
Furthermore, a questionnaire was sent to both CGMAC´s oil and gas 
units, with two main topics: how the work agenda is defined; and which main 
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interests does it suit. Both questions had open answers and multiple-choice 
options. Twenty-five anonymous answers were received. These questions 
were also presented to the coordinators in office during interviews for 
commentary. Again, we summarized and shared each interview for eventual 
correction or complementation.  Appendix B shows the questionnaire used 
and the reference code associated with these interviews. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Brazil, environmental issues remain as a secondary issue in the political 
setting (Cavalcanti 2004). As such, oil and gas exploration was conducted for a 
long time without proper environmental assessment (CGP1, CGP3, CGP6) 
– even after the consolidation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 
which established the necessity that potentially polluting activities undergo 
this process. Only when the market for these undertakings was opened to 
private companies, in the end of the 1990s, was a public unit was established 
to license new projects and regularize existing developments. Since then, 
Brazil has established itself as one of the world’s main oil producers, having 
reached the mark of 2.6 million barrels/day in 2017, 95.2% of which from 
offshore platforms (ANP 2018).
Meanwhile, the governance structure also grew, based chiefly on 
two organizations, ANP and IBAMA (Bredariol & D’avignon, 2018). 
Thus, the regulatory configuration separated fomentation interests from 
environmental concerns. On the other hand, it created coordination 
obstacles. This resulted in the auction of exploratory oil areas without 
previous environmental assessment. Thus, leased oil and gas fields broadly 
overlap with vulnerable deep-sea ecosystems of high biological and 
ecological relevance, including cold-water corals, submarine canyons and 
slope sediments (Almada & Bernardino, 2017). Consequently, undertakings 
might not obtain an environmental permit to conduct the activity of 
interest, despite having purchased this right from the government. After the 
first time this happened, a series of remediation measures followed (Mariano 
& La Rovere, 2007), including two pieces of legislation aiming to define the 
main requirements for environmental permitting (Brasil, 2011) and how 
this relates to strategic assessments of exploration areas, which should occur 
before auctions (Brasil, 2012a). Nonetheless, the first strategic assessment 
of this kind started only in 2015 and none has been finished as of this date. 
Therefore, this institutional conflict remains unsolved and causes insecurity 
in the governance arrangement (CGP1, GOV3, ES1).
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The related action situation, which regards the decision over an 
environmental authorization for an oil and gas project, is influenced by 
two central elements: the information available, which is scarce due to the 
complexity of the system and limited existing research efforts, especially for 
the deep sea (Sweetman et al., 2017); and demands of interested parties, such 
as fishing communities, government agencies and ministries, as well as non-
governmental organizations. Thus, technical opinions are elaborated in view 
of conflicts regarding different interests related to marine use, such as fishing, 
oil exploration or habitat conservation. A recent process showcased this 
when Greenpeace started a worldwide campaign to pressure IBAMA to deny 
environmental permits to drill in a region near the mouth of the Amazon 
river. Following, when technical opinions indicated several shortcomings 
of the environmental study presented, IBAMA denied the permit for this 
undertaking (documentation – Despacho nº 3912994/2018-GABIN SEI). 
The main action situation of this setting relates to the following rules-
in-use. Permitting authorities issue technical opinions regarding requested 
environmental permits (scope rule). Authorities assign environmental 
analysts with the elaboration of these documents (choice rule); such analysts 
enter the public service through public federal exams (boundary rule). These 
exams also function as the main instrument defining the number of positions 
available and must be approved by the federal legislative and executive 
bodies (position rule). Technical opinions should be conclusive and support 
the manifestation of the unit´s coordinator and the general coordination, 
which report to the licensing director and, ultimately, to IBAMA´s president 
(aggregation rule). The project evaluation is based on an environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) which is publicly available, as well as the related 
permitting process, except for cases for which the legislation restricts access 
by those who formulate requests to classify information (information rule). 
This impact assessment considers characteristics of the activity and its most 
significant environmental impacts – a summary of the main aspects involved 
is provided by Cordes et al. (2016). The EIA qualifies the permitting 
procedure and supports the definition of clauses that condition the permits 
granted, including the implementation of environmental projects and best 
practices for pollution prevention. Failure to fulfil these obligations result 
in penalties (e.g. fines, permit suspension) that may also ensue from the 
substantiation of unpredicted impacts or operational characteristics (pay off 
rule). 
In Brazil, the EIA procedure has a series of shortcomings, relating, 
among others, to the following: structural and organizational deficit in 
the environmental agencies; partiality in the technical assessments, since 
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the project’s proponent hires the consulting companies; a poor integration 
between environmental impact analysis and risk assessments; and limited 
public involvement (Naime, 2017). Nonetheless, it is one of the main 
instruments of the national environmental policy, and despite its limited 
scope, plays a major role in the public environmental agenda (Lustosa et 
al., 2010). The experience of the oil and gas permitting units in particular 
shows some distinct qualities such as the follow up of ongoing projects and 
the establishment of technical guidelines that undergo public consultation 
(CGP1, CGP4, CGP5, CGP6, GOV4, ES3), constituting a dynamic process 
which incorporates learning from past activities (Cruz & Montaño, 2016). 
An emblematic example is the IBAMA norm for environmental education 
programs (BRASIL, 2012b). After a series of permitting processes and 
related follow up activities, environmental analysts drafted a technical note 
to indicate directives for environmental education projects presented by the 
offshore industry as mitigation measures for assessed impacts. After public 
consultation and internal review, IBAMA published the technical note in 
2010 (documentation – NOTA TÉCNICA CGPEG/DILIC/IBAMA 
Nº 01/10). This brought predictability to the oil and gas companies and 
provided the qualification of related projects, which led IBAMA to further 
develop the standard and make it applicable to all licensed undertakings.  
Furthermore, the institutional setting has the following key external 
variables: the development of technologies and definition of new industry 
benchmarks (e.g. new oil recovery equipment); the state of the ecosystems 
involved (e.g. information from environmental monitoring programs); the 
structure available for follow-up activities and data integration (e.g. the 
existence of functional environmental databases); the political and economic 
context (e.g. federal policy initiatives, crude oil prices); and third-party 
interaction (e.g. cooperation agreements with ANP, development of new 
regulations with the Ministry of the Environment, demands from the Public 
Prosecution Office). 
This action situation has feedback loops which, due to the lack of 
proper administrative structure and information systems (CGU 2014), 
operate fundamentally through the environmental analysts (CGP1, CGP4, 
ES1, ES2). Hence, results from ongoing environmental projects, on-site 
inspections and oil and gas developments enable learning and the change of 
existing practices (CGP2, CGP3, CGP6, ES3). 
The case of water monitoring projects is useful to illustrate these feedback 
loops. Limited sources of data regarding offshore water characteristics 
together with the concern over potential impacts from produced water 
discharge to the sea (BAKKE et al., 2013) led to the requirement of water 
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monitoring projects for every oil and gas production platform licensed. 
Due to the size and complexity of the marine environment, these projects 
did not produce enough data to enable robust conclusions. Following 
this observation, the institutional arrangement evolved to enable regional 
environmental monitoring programs, integrating results from multiple 
platforms and distinct sampling strategies. Currently, areas with a 
concentration of production platforms have integrated projects, such as 
the Campos Basin where Petrobras alone develops: regional monitoring of 
water, sediment and biota quality, aiming to improve the understanding of 
the marine environment; a focused project to monitor water and sediment 
quality near representative productions facilities, with the objective of 
assessing potential impacts from the activity; and minor water quality 
monitoring, near every production platform that verify effects of produced 
water discharge (documentation – IBAMA Process nº 02022.000490/2010). 
Results of these projects have influenced the content of recent terms of 
reference for the preparation of EIAs, enabling more focused environmental 
studies (documentation – Term of Reference IBAMA nº 0687943 SEI).  
Such continuous improvement, linked to an adaptive management 
strategy, depend on a certain degree of autonomy (CGP1, CGP4, ES2, ES3). 
This is related to the capability of enforcing the conditions established for 
the operation of undertakings and, eventually, negating new requests that 
do not meet environmental standards. The political context sometimes 
undermines this quality, limiting the resources available for field activities 
and even granting permits in discordance with the technical opinions 
issued (e.g. documentation – Operation Permit IBAMA n° 1348/2016 
was granted despite the recommendations of the technical opinion PAR. 
02022.000454/2016-23 CPROD/CGPEG/DILIC/IBAMA). Such events 
are result of political pressures over IBAMA, whose presidency is appointed 
freely by the Environmental Minister and, thus, is a position that rests in 
the power of the Brazilian president. Institutional stability is an important 
attribute in this sense, enabling long term planning and trust building. 
Thus, external variables limit the operational space available, on occasions 
following a perception that the Brazilian environmental permitting process 
is an administrative mechanism to validate and legitimate projects and 
activities, rather than a process to assess, evaluate, and decide about impacts 
(Naime, 2017).
Interestingly, according to interviews and observation, the body of public 
officers organizes itself in a way that promotes robustness and unity (CGP1, 
CGP2, CGP3, CGP4, CGP5, CGP6, GOV2). This happens through 
a mostly horizontal management of the decision making, in which all 
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participants have a voice and search collaboratively for a consensus-oriented 
conduct in each main phase of the process. In a sense, it follows precepts of 
adaptive co-management, where the aim is to build adaptive capacity and 
institutional resilience, using decentralization and devolution as a strategy 
of institutional design (ARMITAGE et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, a hybrid working structure, where the staff is officially 
allocated in teams related to type of projects (e.g. drilling, production) 
and informally cooperate in thematic groups (e.g. emergency response, 
pollution control), assists the sharing of information and the consolidation 
of commons procedures (CGP1, CGP2, CGP3, CGP5). Thus, the formal 
and informal institutions complement each other through different means 
of conflict resolution, knowledge management and resource monitoring. 
The resulting governance system is marked by polycentricity. Not only in 
the broader frame, with environmental outcomes depending on actions from 
ANP, IBAMA, affected communities, non-governmental organizations, the 
industrial sector and other stakeholders, but also internally – where the 
public administration operates based on multiple criteria, including those 
defined informally in different working groups (CGP2, CGP3, CGP4, 
CGP6). 
The questionnaire results corroborate the finding that the work agenda 
is an outcome of multiple factors, with 70.9% of respondents indicating that 
it was composed of all suggested options (coordinator requests, working 
group tasks, follow-up from previous work, own initiative) and only 20.8% 
selecting only one item (8.3% coordinator requests, 8.3% own initiative, 4.2% 
follow-up from previous work). Descriptions of the agenda-setting process 
had in common multiple sources of work, such as pointed out in the following 
response: “Today it is a little of each of them, with a certain preponderance 
of “own initiative”. Generally speaking, unless urgent demands come from 
my boss, I set my own agenda according to my understanding of priorities.”
The results from the second question also point to multiple elements 
related to the work performed. Over 70% of participants, when faced with 
the question of which interests their work generally addresses, responded 
with “society at large” or a combination of the available options. The 
coordinators, on the other hand, observed that they had to manage too 
many issues and a large workforce, being unable to develop the whole work 
agenda (COG1, COG2, GC1). In this context, they highlighted that the 
oil and gas sector is very organized and, thus, can lobby effectively for their 
interests (COG2, CG1) and often constitute the main group with which 
they interact (COG1). 
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Figure 1 presents a compilation of the answers received regarding the 
second topic. Written responses on the matter, qualifying how each factor 
was pertinent to their jobs, were similar to the following reply: “I think I 
mainly attend to society at large by seeking to work for environmental 
protection, which is IBAMA’s mission. But at the same time, I understand 
that my work must meet the industry’s interests, since IBAMA provides 
services that must have predictability and transparency (...) as well as the 
affected communities’ interests, who have in the environmental permitting a 
tool to deal with the impacts to which they are subject.”
In a sense, the environmental permitting serves multiple interests and 
must not only guarantee that offshore oil and gas projects don’t jeopardize 
critical ecosystem services, but also consider knowledge gaps, provide input 
for new legislation, and meet demands from the industry and affected parties 
(CGP1, CGP4, GOV1, ES1).
Source: Author’s own figure
Figure 1 – Responses to the second topic of the questionnaire sent to environmental analysts.
Moreover, the governance system deals with change through supported 
dialogue (CGP1, CGP3, GOV3, GOV4, ES1). One example of this was a 
public program that brought together different spheres of the government 
and representatives of the industrial sector to identify improvement 
opportunities in the environmental permitting of oil and gas undertakings, 
including private sector responsibilities (PROMINP 2014). Important 
factors enabling a joint institutional construction noted in interviews are: 
the limited number of oil companies; the similarity of projects and their 
lengthy time horizon; and the location of most interested parties in the 
Rio de Janeiro region (CGP1, CGP3, CGP4, ES2). In this context, the 
environmental permitting bureau often operates mediating and facilitating 
the co-production of knowledge in order to make it relevant to policy and 
action. 
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Another factor related to the observed institutional development is the 
collaboration between civil servants (CGP1, CGP2, CGP3, CGP4, CGP6). 
Ansell and Gash (2008) suggest that collaborative efforts depend on face-
to-face dialogue, trust building, and the development of commitment and 
shared understanding. Furthermore, existing interdependence favours such 
collaboration and requires time to be effective. These are elements present 
in the studied institutional setting, being exercised in the thematic working 
groups and other forums and generate a commitment that is key to a better 
performance of the units (CGP1, CGP2, CGP3). Moreover, Ostrom 
(2009b) describes many of these aspects as attributes of micro-situations 
that affect the level of cooperation that participants achieve: communication 
is feasible with the full set of participants; reputations of participants are 
known; high marginal per capita returns exist as well as entry or exit 
capabilities; longer time horizon; and agreed-upon sanctioning capabilities 
are present. Considering the institutional situation, in which about 70 civil 
servants work together with reasonable autonomy for individual initiatives, 
only the last attribute is genuinely lacking. Archival records of 2015 indicate 
that environmental analysts have been working in IBAMA with oil and gas 
permitting for over five years on average and a significant proportion (>30%) 
has been in this position for more than ten years. The related legislation 
guaranties reasonable stability, since dismissal is only possible in face of a 
predefined set of criteria and must follow a lengthy review procedure. On the 
other hand, the only possible sanctions are not agreed upon and may assume 
the form of formal negative evaluation conditioning a reduction of wage or 
informal actions (e.g. uncooperative behaviour). 
This kind of social capital – understood as relations of trust, reciprocity, 
common rules, norms, sanctions, and connectedness in institutions – has 
been regarded as the glue for adaptive capacity and collaboration (Folke 
et al. 2005). However, it is not immune to crises and external pressures. 
The current Brazilian context, of fiscal crisis and political dispute (Santos 
& Szwako, 2017) has hampered the environmental governance system. 
It curtailed technical decision making and implied in unstructured 
organizational change (Villardo & Barbosa, 2018). Even so, the complexity 
of the institutional arrangement, comprising different actors and procedures, 
should endow it with some robustness and resilience (Bredariol & Vinha, 
2015). Analysts judge polycentric institutions, with modest overlaps in 
authority and capability, as inefficient because they look messy and are non-
hierarchical in structure, but they help provide a repertoire of principles that 
can be drawn on by users to aid in the crafting of new institutions to cope 
with changing situations (Folke et al.,  2005).
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Evaluating the results of environmental governance systems is challenging, 
since incommensurable perspectives exist. Nonetheless, it is important to 
identify positive features. In this sense, Ostrom (2011) provides six evaluative 
criteria: economic efficiency; fiscal equivalence; redistributive equity; 
accountability; conformance to values of local actors; and sustainability. 
The first parameter cannot be assessed by the data obtained in this study. 
The next two are tenable by the institutional arrangement insofar as the 
project proponents pay for all costs related to the permitting process and 
vulnerable populations are a focus of the EIA. Thus, several undertakings 
have mitigating measures related to these groups, such as the development 
of compensatory projects for low income fisherman communities, which 
have a say in the elaboration of these projects and receive tangible benefits 
(e.g. ice factories, training courses, safety improvements for the fishing fleet) 
(documentation – IBAMA Process nº 02022.003014/2005). Moreover, 
regarding accountability and conformance to values of local actors, both 
are constricted by limited specific informal initiatives – such as preliminary 
public meetings to explain projects to communities in areas of special 
interest – or formal less productive procedures, as public hearings with no 
binding outcomes (CGP1, CGP2, CGP6, GOV3). Lastly, in respect to the 
sustainability of the system, this rests mainly in the collaborative efforts, which 
allow for adaptability and the search for effectiveness. A related feature is the 
complementarity of formal and informal institutions that enables a higher 
resilience of the system, supported also by other organizations (e.g. ANP, 
Public Prosecution Office) that demand and cooperate in the advancement 
of the environmental agenda. 
CONCLUSION
This study has allowed the identification of central challenges, functions 
and features of one specific environmental governance system. Thus, 
the following conclusions should not be promptly generalized to other 
situations but may be used to provide insights and aid in problem solving or 
institutional design.
Firstly, an environmental governance system should consider the 
interest of affected parties and address the various existing concerns, 
aiming to enhance environmental quality. This will favour involvement 
and cooperation among stakeholders. In this context, public offices often 
must provide a common information base for communication, promote 
participation and guarantee compliance to established rules. Furthermore, 
multiple criteria should be the basis for the dialogue necessary to enable 
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such efforts, involving not only technical elements (e.g. ecosystem state 
information), but also political aspects (e.g. redistributive equity) and 
support accountability. Hence, cooperation is a key feature since it assures 
the function of enabling participation, being favoured by functional 
communication between participants, agreed upon spheres of action and 
a longer time horizon. The internal situation of the studied coordinations 
former CGPEG, specifically, achieves cooperative engagement through: a 
shared understanding of the units’ goals; interdependence between actions; 
activities that promote the integration of the personnel (e.g. workshops for 
technical discussion and guideline development); among other elements 
(CGP 1, CGP 2, CGP 3, CGP5, CGP 6). Moreover, the limited number 
of participating actors and the fact that most interested parties where 
located in the same region, centred in Rio de Janeiro, concentrated capacity 
building efforts and reduced transaction costs, allowing the development of 
a continuous supported dialogue.
Next, the nature of the existing interaction between stakeholders is a 
central variable in the governance system. Structured and long term means 
of joint institutional building can lead to continuous improvement and 
benefit adaptability through an experimentation and learning process. 
Flexible institutions and enabling legislation create opportunities for 
adaptive co-management and self-organization (Folke et al., 2005). In 
this sense, it is interesting to note that the studied governance system 
shows a degree of polycentricity, having numerous formal and informal 
decision centres that slightly overlap in a mostly complementary fashion. 
Moreover, it participated in initiatives where the operational rules under 
which it functions were elaborated, such as the legislative framework for 
the environmental permitting of offshore oil and gas activities, resulting 
in the design of institutional innovations such as regional environmental 
studies and projects that serve multiple undertakings (Brasil, 2011). These 
novel instruments have brought more effectiveness to the environmental 
permitting process, despite the lack of optimal information systems (e.g. 
integrated databases) (CPG 1, CGP 4, CPG 6, GOV 3, ES 1, ES 3). Thus, 
stability is a key feature which relates to the function of institution building 
and continued learning. A quality that makes such institutional evolution 
possible is the permanence of civil servants in the public administration. 
It facilitates the learning process, providing qualified work based on hands-on 
experience and continuous improvement of existent standards. Furthermore, 
insofar as collaboration depends on trust building, this permanence assures 
that some auxiliary factors may function beneficially, such as the knowledge 
of the reputation of participants. 
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Finally, environmental governance, as an instrument for collective choice, 
must deal with power asymmetries, political preferences and knowledge gaps 
in a complex setting. Therefore, it depends on the public environmental 
organization retaining some degree of autonomy to articulate and arbitrate 
other actor’s interests. In the case studied, this implies the capacity of 
guaranteeing the implementation of projects as defined in the permitting 
process as well as the possibility of declining requests that do not meet 
applying criteria. In this sense, the post-permit phase, with monitoring of 
project implementation and enforcement of established requirements, may 
provide the means necessary to organize valuable information and is essential 
to enable adjustments and learning in the related processes.  Consequently, 
autonomy is a key feature associated to the function of establishing 
operational limits and guaranteeing compliance to defined restrictions. This 
capacity rests on practical sanctioning mechanisms and a reasonable set of 
checks and balances, such as the opposing pressures of industry influence 
via government and society´s demands from the Public Prosecution Office. 
Moving further, the state should aim to broaden its ties with society, enabling 
effective accountability and participation procedures in governance systems. 
Figure 2 displays the key functions and features identified in this study.
Source: Author’s own figure
Figure 2 – Key Functions of an Environmental Governance System and  
Related Features of the Public Administration
One final remark is that the public administration, when faced with 
multiple demands related to diverse interests, may well behave as a common 
pool resource, with the traits of subtractability of use and difficulty of 
users’ exclusion. As seen in this article, work in public offices can arise from 
multiple sources and addresses society at large. Thus, public administration 
might also share principles related to common pool resource governance, 
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CGMAC Civil Servants
• CGP1 Manager at CGMAC/DILIC/IBAMA
• CGP2 Technical staff at CGMAC/DILIC/IBAMA
• CGP3 Technical staff at CGMAC/DILIC/IBAMA
• CGP4 Technical staff at CGMAC/DILIC/IBAMA
• CGP5 Technical staff at CGMAC/DILIC/IBAMA
• CGP6 Manager at CGMAC/DILIC/IBAMA
Other Government Actors
• GOV1 Manager at COEND/DILIC/IBAMA
• GOV2 Technical staff at DILIC/IBAMA
• GOV3 Manager at ANP
• GOV4 Manager at DPC/Navy
Under Economic Sector
•	 ES1 Manager at Brazilian Petroleum, Gas and Biofuels Institute (IBP)
•	 ES2 Staff at an oil and natural gas services company
•	 ES3 Staff at a consulting company for environmental impact reports
Appendix A – Brief qualification of interviewees
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Questionnaire Form – Common Pool Resources Research
The research aims to explore how the work agenda is defined and which interests / groups it 
serves.
1. In general how do you define what you are going to do at work?
• Direct Requests from Coordinator
• Through Technical Working Groups
• Follow-up from previous work
• Own initiative
• Other and / or a combination of the above (please specify in the description below)
Brief description of your work agenda:
2. In general which interests / groups does your work address?
• Society at large
• Affected communities (e.g. fishermen, quilombolas, caiçaras)
• Oil and Gas Companies
• Others (e.g. Public Prosecutors, NGOs, scientific community) and / or a combination 
of the above (please specify in the description below)
Brief description of which interests / groups your work agenda suits: 
Brief qualification of interviewees
Appendix B – Questionnaire and Identification of Interviewees
(COG1) Coordinator of the Oil and Gas Exploration Coordination
(COG2) Coordinator of the Oil and Gas Production Coordination
(GC1) General Coordination of Marine and Coastal Undertakings
